Learning to Tackle Climate Change by Tanner, Thomas et al.
How can continuous learning and reflection help tackle climate 
change in the context of wider development challenges?  
This interactive PDF aims to support ongoing learning by those 
inside and outside DFID to develop their own learning journey 
- no matter what their country, context or level of personal 
expertise. It reflects the combined knowledge of DFID staff and 
external experts generated over two years on a shared learning 
journey through the Learning Hub.
Beginning Your Learning Journey: 
The different sections of the PDF support the reader to reflect on 
different aspects of climate change and development in relation 
to their own work. The sections can be read individually and in 
any order depending on the reader’s learning needs.
Clickable links between sections are embedded in the PDF, as 
well as links to the Learning Hub’s themed outputs from the 
learning cycles in the form of Bridging Papers, Learning Notes, 
Case Study Notes, Briefing Notes and Research Papers.
This material has been funded by UKAid from the Department for International Development; however, the views 
expressed do not officially reflect the Departments policies.
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GOALS
This section details the implications of 
addressing climate change and delivering 
current and future progress in tackling 
poverty.
CONTEXT
This section shows 
why understanding the specific 
institutional and political context is 
critical for determining opportunities 
and constraints for delivering on 
climate change.
FOCUS
This section maps 
out the types of 
analysis, relationships 
and interventions 
needed for moving 
towards a development 
agenda that is both 
low carbon 
and climate 
resilient.
Outputs from the Learning Hub 
journey are linked throughout 
the text and include: 
Hub event outcomes, bridging expert 
and practitioner knowledge in four 
learning cycles: (1) Approaches to 
Planning; (2) Tackling Poverty; (3); 
Low Carbon Energy; and (4) Difficult 
Environments
Sharing lessons from recent examples 
of policy and practice
Checklists of actions related to the 
four learning cycles
Deeper insights on a topic
Practical and theoretical insights into 
core challenges
ORGANISATION
This section relates individual climate 
change learning to the existing 
organisational structure and 
learning processes.
CHANGE
This section 
shares some 
Learning Hub 
 answers to the 
question ‘what 
makes addressing 
climate change 
different from 
business-as-usual in 
development?’
MENU
This e-book shares the 
knowledge and insights from 
two years of shared learning 
between DFID staff,  
IDS and other external 
experts through the Learning 
Hub programme.
ORGANISATION 1
The nature of the climate change problem requires that DFID and other 
development organisations are able to foster continuous learning. The starting 
point for climate change learning is not the technical detail, but how it relates 
to the organisation itself.
The Learning Hub experience highlighted a number of lessons for organisational learning 
around climate change.
1. ‘It is a journey not a destination’ − Integrating 
climate change into development is an ongoing 
process.
2. ‘I’ve got a particular learning context’ − Learning 
and communications have to engage different 
audiences in different contexts, and recognise 
that people begin the learning journey from 
different starting points (see example in the 
‘differentiating audiences’ table).
3. ‘Make it speak action to me’ − Communications 
need to make climate change relevant for personal behavioural change and outline 
strategies for action not just analysis.
4. ‘It’s not really my issue’ − Climate change communication has to challenge a person’s 
reluctance to engage, needs to embrace cultural change, encourage strong leadership 
and develop a coherent vision.
1. Lessons for learning on climate change in DFID
ORGANISATION:
What is my organisational 
context?
Differentiating audiences and 
actions according to growth, 
emissions and governance contexts.
ORGANISATION - 
Start
ORGANISATION 2
The organisational response to climate change combines aspects of leadership, strategy, 
policy and programming, housekeeping and learning. Experience from the Hub suggests 
that key questions for staff to ask include:
Who leads on climate change and who can I work with to take climate change forward?
Does climate change feature in my department’s operational plan? Should it feature?
How should this be reflected in my work objectives? 
What tools and learning resources are available to assist me? 
What strategic guidance can I take from my Strategic Programme Review (SPR)?
Leadership 
‘If we are serious about development we need to be serious about climate change’ 
Mark Lowcock, Permanent Secretary, DFID, 2011.
The speeches of the International Development Secretary 
and the development of a network of Senior Climate Change 
Champions in DFID signal intent to lead from the top of 
the organisation. Climate and Environment Advisers across 
the organisation provide technical support to policies, 
development of all business cases and programme design 
and implementation. In addition, DFID has teams to provide 
policy and knowledge support on climate and environment, 
and a research team focused on building longer-term 
evidence.
The key challenge is to embed climate change issues within 
the context of the work of all staff, not just those working 
on specific climate change programmes. The Learning Hub 
experience suggests this means focusing on co-benefits 
and relating climate to other development priorities such as growth, employment, 
health, infrastructure resilience, food security, social protection or livelihoods. Coherent 
shared narratives and vision are required to enable leadership to drive change through the 
organisation.
Strategy, Policies and Programmes
Climate change issues are driven strategically through pillar six of the 2011−2015 DFID 
Business Plan, which prioritises the need to ‘Drive urgent action to tackle climate change, 
and support adaptation and low carbon growth in developing countries’. DFID’s spending 
on programmes that explicitly address climate change objectives has increased dramatically 
as part of UK commitments including £1.5 billion to Fast Start Finance for 2010–12 pledged 
under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the development 
of the cross-UK government International Climate Fund.
2. How is DFID addressing climate change?
Climate Champions
The role of the Climate 
Champions is to 
demonstrate authentic 
leadership in this area of 
DFID’s work through:
• leading by example 
• informing, creating 
strategy
• building skills and 
knowledge
• aligning culture and 
structure to desired 
change
ORGANISATION 3
Across the organisation, DFID’s approach to 
becoming Climate Smart draws together strands 
of leadership, greening of operations by reducing 
their environmental footprint, awareness and skills, 
integrating climate risks and opportunities into 
programming, and design of future investments 
(see Climate Smart Pillars diagram).
It includes ‘proofing’ or altering programmes to 
integrate climate change risks and opportunities 
based on the Climate and Environment assessment 
process - all DFID interventions require a Climate 
and Environment categorisation and impact assessment as part of Business Case procedures 
as a way of identifying potential risks and opportunities. Crucially, it also asks what needs to 
be done differently for future investment to meet climate change challenges.
Strategic Programme Reviews (SPRs) are 
being rolled out across country offices and 
to all business units in DFID to integrate the 
Climate Smart approach and build resilience 
as a core element of DFID’s approach. These 
provide a common framework for analysis, 
action and learning, whilst recognising the 
different starting points and ambitions of 
different parts of the organisation.
Learning 
The Learning Hub drew on a range of formal and informal learning mechanisms.  
In DFID, formal mechanisms include:
regional meetings and annual conferences which bring advisory staff from country 
programmes together with headquarters colleagues for several days
standalone training events 
lunchtime seminars
emailed policy updates and messages, often containing links to commissioned research 
activities and outputs
While much learning occurs more informally, including:
individual learning (such as membership of e-groups, or reading papers sourced 
through a Google search, meetings with external experts or partners)
informal/semi-formal networks (e.g. Asia/Africa/Global/Professional networks through 
which articles of interest are circulated, or responses to issues are discussed)
ad hoc discussions with colleagues (e.g. chats at the tea-making point)
learning-by-doing is probably the most powerful incentive to learn in DFID (e.g. being 
tasked to facilitate an SPR, comment on a business plan or present a seminar). These 
moments of potential exposure provide strong incentives for learning
Pillars of Climate Smart programme
Key lessons from pilots of the Strategic 
Programme Reviews (SPR) include:
• The Office Head must lead the process
• Enable time and space for exploration and 
conversations
• Set targets and monitor and publish and be 
held accountable
• Include Climate Smart as a standing 
issue to report on at ‘in-days’ or weekly 
leadership meetings
ORGANISATION 4
The Learning Hub experience supports the need for linking formal and informal learning 
mechanisms, including facilitated problem-solving and ‘safe’ spaces where views can be 
exchanged frankly and where learning from failure can be constructive. Internal shared 
websites can bridge and link these mechanisms, but Learning Hub experiences suggest that 
these need to be stimulated by face-to-face shared dialogue, exchange of experiences and 
creative problem-solving exercises. 
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rxMEibhDf9k
Learning Hub discussions suggest that in tackling climate change, DFID has much to learn 
from other experiences. Firstly, it can draw on experience of mainstreaming other cross-
cutting issues such as gender and HIV/AIDS (Elsey et al., 2005), which suggest the need to:
create and maintain momentum around mainstreaming through increasing visibility 
and delivering excellent communications 
develop a strong evidence base around the links between climate change and 
development and use this evidence consistently to embed climate change issues in 
development actions
establish focal points in key departments and sectors with the responsibility, skills and 
time allocated for acting as catalysts or facilitators of responses by all staff
ongoing training and support to carry out these roles effectively
The latter points reflect ongoing efforts in DFID to build and nurture climate change expertise 
in individuals across the organisation, and then to use that network as a system for people to 
promote change and encourage learning throughout DFID. 
3. There is much to learn from other experiences of integrating cross-
cutting topics
ORGANISATION 5
The Learning Hub experience also highlighted the need to understand how to influence 
people’s behaviour in order to integrate climate change across other areas. by There is a 
need to prepare a range of strategies appropriate for people with different views on climate 
change; this process can drawn on previous work such as that for building sustainable 
lifestyles (see the ‘Influencing behaviour’  diagram). Such strategies may include:
Encouraging: Providing incentives and 
disincentives, such as including climate 
change response in staff performance 
appraisals
Enabling: Providing the systems and skills 
to make it easier to act, such as office-wide 
engagement in the SPRs
Exemplifying: Demonstrate shared 
responsibility and that others are acting, 
such as through visible actions of the Climate 
Champions 
Engaging: Get people involved and work with 
others to co-produce integration strategies, 
for example through collaborative work between DFID’s country offices and Policy 
Division
Finally, DFID can draw on private sector organisational responses to climate change,  
which highlight the importance of:
strong leadership from the top of the organisation 
internal green targets and monitoring on emissions, waste and water
simplifying the challenge by providing clear focus and targets linked to performance 
incentives
This can be further supported by:
integrating across the business through staff training
measuring and rewarding performance 
making use of champions, and public recognition
After these processes of embedding change, the use of innovation funds can be deployed to 
promote further change as the organisation evolves via a process of continuous improvement 
to a higher level of sustainability. 
Influencing behaviour requires 
different strategies for different 
groups
Adapted from: DEFRA Centre of 
Expertise on Influencing Behaviour
ORGANISATION 6
Where next?
Problem-solving exercises through the Learning Hub suggest an approach to organisational 
change for DFID that includes:
Narratives: Develop a vision with short, clear theories of change for aspects of climate 
change and development, along with SMART indicators 
Leadership: From key individuals across DFID but also ensuring that top management 
are the ones to champion climate change with Office and Department Heads, who 
then themselves make the case to Directors supporting them to make brave choices
Resources: Use the theory of change and indicators to make the case for support to 
climate change activities in a country/region, including dedicated staffing as well as 
programme resources
Processes: Engage opportunistically with changes to DFID business processes, aligning 
new processes with what needs to be done to support climate change (for example in 
revisions to the Business Case procedure, the Project Cycle Management guidance or 
structure of Project Documents)
4. Key elements of an approach to integrating climate change 
This e-book shares the 
knowledge and insights from 
two years of shared learning 
between DFID staff,  
IDS and other external 
experts through the Learning 
Hub programme.
CHANGE 1
A common question from the Learning Hub experience was:
what makes addressing climate change different from business-as-usual in 
development?
Drawing on the Learning Hub experience this section present some answers 
to the question. 
 Climate change and development responses are intrinsically linked:
the 2006 Stern Review describes climate change adaptation as ‘an extension of good 
development practice’, such as water management or disaster preparedness 
actions that create lower carbon emissions are often consistent with other development 
and environment goals, such as renewable energy providing energy access, or fuel-
efficient stoves that reduce indoor air pollution and reduce pressure for firewood and 
charcoal
Integrating climate change and development responses will promote a more efficient 
approach to achieving overlapping objectives. It can help avoid climate change actions 
that could inadvertently threaten poverty reduction objectives, such as flood protection that 
restricts agricultural drainage, or biofuels plantation that affects local food security. As a 
result, there has been a strong drive to mainstream climate change issues into development 
policy and practice rather than treat climate change in isolation.
Learning Hub discussions asked whether adjusting existing programmes through a 
mainstreaming approach will be a sufficient response or whether a transformational 
response is needed.  This hinges on whether climate change impacts will outstrip the 
capacity of current approaches, and whether current trends in greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction will prevent dangerous climate change. This poses difficult questions, including:
Should we keep investing in low-lying delta areas prone to sea-level rises?
Can humanitarian efforts continue to support more frequent food shortages due to 
drought?
1. We need to do ‘good development’ and develop new approaches
CHANGE:
How is climate change 
a game changer for 
development?
CHANGE - 
Start
CHANGE 2
Is the current fossil fuel-based growth model compatible with avoiding dangerous 
climate change? 
Are existing regulatory approaches sufficient to protect forest stocks? 
Should we invest in agriculture that maximises economic and livelihood benefits 
without considering adaptation and mitigation benefits and impact on forests?
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sWuakY9g0pE
Incremental change may come up against institutional barriers that can only be overcome 
through more radical and transformational change – due for example to locking into high 
carbon pathways through dirty energy investments,  or the use of disaster relief as a 
political tool that prevents investment in prevention. In practice, it is likely that a combination 
of scaling-up efforts and making relatively small changes to existing approaches will be 
required, but alongside innovative experimental initiatives. 
One of the key conclusions from the Learning Hub was that tackling climate change requires 
greater attention to reflection and learning.
This is because:
we have limited experience with the required responses (so less certainty of achieving 
results)  
there are competing visions of the problem and its solution (each telling plausible but 
conflicting tales of climate change)
climate change introduces new sources of uncertainty due to future emissions 
scenarios, climate and impact models and the existing uncertainty of the changing 
development landscape on which impacts play out
the cross-sectoral nature of climate change adds an additional layer of complexity 
(climate change cuts across sectors and scales)
2. A learning approach is therefore crucial
CHANGE 3
some impacts may outstrip coping capacities (either limits to human capacities to cope 
with repeated shocks, or biophysical limits such as loss of irrigation from retreating 
glaciers)
it challenges the economic growth-based model (a model which has generated 
significant greenhouse gas emissions and depends on an ultimately finite and scarce 
resource) 
it requires us to reconcile potentially conflicting objectives (to achieve poverty 
reduction that is also consistent with adaptation and a low carbon economy)
Working on climate change therefore requires a learning approach – it is a complex issue 
and experience is evolving rapidly. This makes it a challenging area for development 
approaches that focus on achieving predefined impacts and value for money. Emphasising 
reflection and learning can help challenge ways of working, ways of viewing problems, 
and points of view. 
The Learning Hub experience supports the need for linking formal and informal learning 
mechanisms, including facilitated problem-solving and ‘safe’ spaces where views can be 
exchanged frankly.  Internal shared websites can bridge and link these mechanisms, 
but Learning Hub experiences suggest that these need to be stimulated by face-to-face 
shared problem-solving exercises. 
The need for innovation and testing of new approaches in climate change requires learning 
to continuously build on experience. For an organisation such as DFID, this means going 
beyond ‘single loop learning’ that simply focuses on problem-solving. This may be based on 
acquiring new skills and developing capacities to improve performance; for example 
through learning about how to use Marginal Abatement Cost Curves  or Political 
Economy,   as tools for analysis of climate change issues.
Instead, the Learning Hub process was based on 
enhancing ‘double loop’ learning that enabled 
participants to question the underlying assumptions 
in which their skills are employed (see the 
‘Learning’ diagram). For example, participants 
challenged the assumptions that planned 
adaptation interventions are the best delivery 
mechanism and stressed the need for greater 
consideration of the role of informal and 
autonomous adaptation processes.  
From single to double loop learning
CHANGE 4
As a predictive science of a complex system, 
models of future climate change impacts generate 
a cascade of increasing uncertainty as they move 
towards information relevant to decision-making 
(see the ‘Cascade’ diagram).
This uncertainty is in addition to the uncertainty 
of the future development landscape onto which 
these impacts will be overlaid. These include 
urbanisation, migration, agrarian change, 
population dynamics, and the economic impacts 
of mitigation or adaptation actions that are taken. 
 Crucially, climate change impacts and 
responses are overlaid onto existing development processes 
and challenges. As a consequence, the links between 
climate change and, for example, conflict or migration are 
not straightforward or readily predictable.  
The high levels of uncertainty arising from future climate 
change make the quantification of risk difficult.  One 
response has been to design plans and programmes that are 
robust across a range of future scenarios. Such an approach 
will favour designs that are effective across a wider range of 
future conditions – for example, integrated catchment 
management approaches to flood and drought management. 
Or it may mean a more diversified portfolio of interventions. 
Exploring the implications of scenarios for specific regions 
(a country, an agricultural region, a city) can help to identify 
critical challenges or the potential surprises a region may 
face as the climate changes. 
Decision-making will therefore need to go beyond standard economic efficiency and 
political feasibility to take on board flexibility and robustness. This will tend to favour 
measures that have a low opportunity cost, are reversible, flexible, and deliver multiple co-
benefits as a starting point. Avoiding inflexible decisions is particularly crucial to ensure that 
risks are not locked into future development paths. 
Advocates of ‘climate justice’ argue that climate change alters the basis for development 
cooperation. Developing countries are increasingly demanding significantly scaled-up 
climate finance and a right to determine how it is spent. DFID increasingly needs to work 
with other UK government departments to manage the relationships between existing aid 
flows and finance through UNFCCC mechanisms, including the Green Climate Fund.
A key challenge will be to integrate climate change actions within other development 
activities whilst accounting for what is additional ‘climate’ finance.
3. Climate change adds even greater uncertainty to decision-making and is 
overlaid on existing development challenges
4. Climate change is changing the development landscape of finance, 
institutions and actors
The cascade of uncertainty in 
climate models
Climate and Migration
The UK Government’s 
Foresight report on Global 
Environment Change and 
Migration highlighted that 
environmental change is 
as likely to make migration 
less probable as it is to 
make it more probable 
due to a reduction in the 
capital required to enable 
a move. Consequently, 
in the decades ahead, 
millions of people will be 
unable to move away from 
locations in which they are 
extremely vulnerable to 
environmental change.
CHANGE 5
The scale of finance required outstrips the likely contribution from public funds. There is an 
expectation that the private sector will provide a significant proportion of climate finance, 
alongside other financing measures such as the proposed international aviation tax.
The challenge for development agencies will be how to leverage private sector finance, 
such as through the Climate Public-Private Partnership (CP3),  while maintaining 
attention to governance and equity issues that ensure delivery to poor people and avoid 
potential over-subsidy and the creation of perverse incentives. 
The emergence of climate change institutions will alter the landscape of development 
institutions and actors. These include international bodies, such as: 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) − which undertakes scientific 
assessments
UNFCCC − the international forum and the legal framework for global agreements on 
climate change   
transnational bodies − for example the World Mayors Council on Climate Change
And national bodies, such as:
cross-government climate change committees for coordination and financial flows
national bodies for projects such as the Adaptation Fund or Clean Development 
Mechanism
NGO coordination groups campaigning for climate justice, e.g. www.350.org  or 
www.tcktcktck.org
private sector networks such as the World Business Council on Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD) and the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA)
businesses, including transnational corporations 
This results in new configurations of actors and their interrelationships with development 
institutions. Internationally, there may be positioning between development institutions to 
take advantage and leadership of the climate change and development agenda, for example 
between the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions. There may be a need for DFID 
to develop new partnerships in developing countries, for example with private sector 
actors in renewable energy or insurance companies.
These changing financial flows, sets of actors, and incentive structures are likely to alter the 
conditions for donors seeking to tackle climate change in developing countries. Using a 
political economy approach is therefore crucial when designing and implementing climate 
change and development initiatives. 
Climate change and development issues are necessarily cross-sectoral; they require 
involvement of a wide range of actors and interests, negotiating actions and governance 
processes across scales  
Despite this, climate change responses are frequently driven by technological and 
managerial solutions that treat the policy process as linear and apolitical
CHANGE #
Climate change has been mainly seen as a global issue, with insufficient attention paid 
to political interests or governance arrangements at national or sub-national levels 
 
There are significant differences in ideological views on how to tackle climate change, 
for example between those supporting market-led versus state-led responses in REDD+
The growth of climate change initiatives and finance alters incentive structures for 
different actors and may lead to attempts to capture benefits for particular groups at 
the expense of others.
Where next?
CHANGE 6
This e-book shares the 
knowledge and insights from 
two years of shared learning 
between DFID staff,  
IDS and other external 
experts through the Learning 
Hub programme.
GOALS 1
DFID has long been committed to the overall vision of eliminating poverty, and 
the 2015 objective of meeting the Millennium Development Goals. Climate 
change has implications for current and future progress in tackling poverty 
across a range of existing routes to higher incomes and better wellbeing for 
poor people. These include urbanisation, migration, sustainable livelihoods, 
food security, agriculture, health, social protection, disaster resilience 
and wider economic growth. To ensure that progress in reducing poverty 
continues, DFID therefore has to contribute to addressing both the effects 
and the causes of climate change. In the course of the Learning Hub, several 
strategic messages emerged about how climate change affects DFID’s goals.
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1dRl0VTY0DU
 One key reason why existing experience and knowledge are highly relevant is that, 
while poverty and vulnerability to climate change are not identical, they do share the same 
root cause − the lack of ability to withstand multiple shocks and stresses. At the same time, 
climate change itself is adding to and altering the shocks and stresses that poor people 
experience. In rural areas, this is partly because of changes in seasonality, with impacts on 
livelihoods, food security, illness, and access to markets.
1. Much of what we already know about tackling poverty is still relevant 
in the context of a changing climate
GOALS: 
How are my goals affected by  
climate change?
GOALS - 
Start
GOALS 2
The resilience of individuals, households or communities to both poverty and climate 
shocks depends not just on income, economic assets such as land, or access to labour and 
credit. It is also the result of a wider range of entitlements and capabilities, including social 
networks, health and education, infrastructure provision and access to natural resources, all 
of which are affected by the quality of governance, the possibilities for empowerment and 
voice, and the underlying political economy.  
Thus one theme emphasised in the Learning Hub was that a multidimensional understanding 
of poverty and wellbeing is especially important for understanding vulnerability to climate 
change, especially where governments are focused mainly on overall economic growth.
In this context, it is crucial for development 
organisations such as DIFD to keep poor people at 
the centre when thinking about climate change 
programming. The ‘locating poverty’ diagram 
emerged from the Learning Hub to capture this 
idea (initiated by Su-Lin Garbett Shiels).
It should prompt a set of questions for any programme: 
What institutions immediately surround poor people, including those governing 
inequalities between men, women and children? 
How can we support poor peoples’ own efforts at poverty reduction and adaptation 
to climate change? 
What are the sectoral contexts and points of intervention? 
What are the wider political, governance and policy contexts, and how might these 
be improved? 
How is climate change influencing each of these through environmental stresses and 
increased environmental uncertainty?
A key implication of this approach, identified in the Learning Hub but also recognised in the 
wider climate and development community, is that a crucial part of responding to climate 
change is building the capacity to adapt. The key building blocks of that capacity − such as 
inclusive economic growth, social protection, health, education, infrastructure and strong 
institutions − are the same as those required for equitable development. 
Locating poverty at the heart of the 
climate change response
GOALS 3
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D66AOA_UvPc
There are similar ‘low regrets’ opportunities in low carbon development, with many 
interventions having multiple poverty reduction benefits that can also reduce carbon 
emissions against business-as-usual growth. One example is managing forest resources 
sustainably, in ways that ensure local communities retain access to such resources.  
New energy technologies − including providing improved cook stoves, solar PV lighting, 
solar irrigation pumps, and energy from agricultural waste – offer not only a lower carbon 
development path but also potential co-benefits for health, education and livelihoods, 
including benefits specifically for women and girls. 
A key insight from the Hub is that the interventions that offer the largest carbon emissions 
reduction (such as improving energy efficiency in the industrial sector, or power sector 
reform), are those where the poverty reduction benefits will be indirect (through increased 
employment or greater pro-poor spending because of efficiency savings). Achieving low 
carbon and poverty-reducing development is therefore highly dependent on complementary 
policies and specific project design.  Again, starting from the point of view of the poor 
should help to capture such policies and design opportunities. 
Finally, while ‘good’ development builds adaptive capacity and can be low carbon, this 
does not mean it is actually found in all developing countries. Although there has been 
considerable progress in some countries in the last few decades, deep poverty remains 
widespread, not only in low-income countries but also in some middle-income countries. 
Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia, the effectiveness of many 
institutions also remains low. In these contexts, the root causes of poverty remain 
unaddressed, adaptive capacity is weak and the prospects for low carbon development are 
not good. Priorities for action by DFID will depend on context. For example, in fragile 
states, the initial key goal for climate resilient development will often be to build a peaceful 
state. 
Even where there is ‘good’ development that also builds adaptive capacity and the potential 
for low carbon growth, climate change will demand specific, new additional programmes 
and policy engagement. This is because of the ‘change’ in climate change. 
2. But some of the challenges of climate change are new, and do require 
new responses and skills 
GOALS 4
In many cases this is about dealing with potential impacts that are likely to lie in the future, 
such as significant sea-level rises. In other cases, it is about change that is happening now, 
such as increasing unpredictability in growing seasons. New approaches identified in the 
Learning Hub included:
Existing aid programmes need to be climate-proofed (i.e. screened for climate risks 
and opportunities)
Climate change also creates an additional source of uncertainty in development 
planning, which makes conventional cost-benefit analysis problematic and often 
requires decision-making through scenarios instead 
Delivering adaptation, i.e. specific investments or changes in practice that respond to 
current or future climate extremes and trends (such as introducing drought-resistant 
crops or installing adequate storm drains) 
Delivering adaptation, i.e. specific investments or changes in practice that respond to 
current or future climate extremes and trends (such as introducing drought-resistant 
crops or installing adequate storm drains)
The low carbon part of low carbon development is bringing a new focus on energy and 
how to leverage private finance, as well as specific policy areas such as carbon pricing 
and low carbon innovation  
Communities need access to information to help them make informed decisions about 
their current and future strategies
As noted above, there are many synergies, or ‘win-wins’ to be found that meet both poverty 
reduction and emissions reductions goals. However, in some circumstances there will 
also be trade-offs between goals that DFID will have to negotiate, especially in the short 
term. For example, under existing policies, with no carbon pricing or technology policy 
support in most countries, renewable energy sources can be a more expensive option than 
conventional fossil fuels for powering grid electricity and extending energy access.
Nevertheless, the scope for such actions is often larger than conventionally thought. This 
is because the long-lived nature of investments, and inertia and learning-by-doing effects 
means that even more expensive emissions abatement measures may sometimes be needed 
to get an economy on a low carbon development path that contributes to mitigation and 
poverty reduction (Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte, 2011). The view taken in such cases will also 
depend on the discount rate used to balance current and future welfare.
In other cases, for example growing biofuels or investment in large-scale hydroelectric 
schemes, the trade-offs are not across time but between groups, as there may be direct 
negative impacts on some poor people, through displacement from land for growing 
biofuels or for hydroelectric projects. 
Equally, with limited resources there can be trade-offs between reducing poverty and 
reducing vulnerability to climate-related stresses and shocks. This is because while the two 
are often linked, they are not identical; some poor people are less vulnerable to climate 
change impacts than others who are relatively better off. 
These latter types of trade-off are not specific to climate change, since they can arise in 
development processes more widely. The experience from the Learning Hub is that there 
is no easy way of dealing with these trade-offs, but that it is essential to be aware of them 
when making decisions. 
GOALS 5
One of the most important discussions in the Learning Hub was about getting the balance 
right between investing in broader capacity and investing in specific measures for additional 
adaptation or low carbon opportunities.
The Learning Hub picked up on two models that 
are useful for guiding action on adaptation. One 
is the ‘adaptation pyramid’ (developed by Kate 
Binns, see diagram). This helps show the different 
targets of interventions, from general development, 
to a focus on all types of vulnerability, to a focus 
on specific climate vulnerabilities, to a focus on 
adapting to climate change (as opposed to short-
term current variability), with examples of each. 
It also shows that most activities in building the 
long-term capacity to adapt to climate change will 
be at the lower levels of the pyramid in areas such 
as health, education and governance.
At the Hub event in Addis Ababa, the ‘balance of 
effort’ model for adaptation (proposed by Praveen 
Wignarajah, see diagram), makes a similar point. 
This model illustrates how the balance of climate 
change investment changes across time and 
different development circumstances. The model 
hypothesises that as overall levels of development 
and income rise, the share of investment directed 
at strengthening underlying resilience should fall, 
with a greater share being directed at specifically 
addressing the anticipated impacts of climate 
change. 
 A major concern amongst Learning Hub participants was to not lose sight of a 
long-term need for transformation in response to climate change, amongst day-to-day 
pressures to deliver results in the short term. 
The idea of ‘resilience’ suggests an ability both to manage risk ahead of a shock and to 
bounce back afterwards. Many conventional development interventions, including support 
to livelihoods and providing health services, are about helping poor people to build their 
own resilience and escape poverty within a given context. These interventions will also 
often help to build the capacity to adapt to climate change in an incremental way. 
However, in some contexts (examples might include coastal zones prone to sea-level rises 
in Bangladesh or agriculture in increasingly drought-stricken regions), adaptation will 
need to involve the transformation of economies and societies in the longer term. This is 
because the greater frequency and severity of extreme events, trends in temperature and 
shifts in seasonality all mean that an incremental approach may become increasingly no 
longer viable; people may not be able to ‘bounce back’, let alone escape poverty, even with 
assistance. 
3. A key challenge for climate change programming is getting the balance 
right 
4. In the long run (and in some contexts sooner) incremental change will 
not be enough, and transformation will be required
The Adaptation Pyramid
The ‘Balance of Effort’ Model
Transformation suggests large-scale, structural changes to the context, including land use, 
livelihood possibilities and migration. Adaptation examples might be a major move away 
from farming to landscape tourism in a particular area or the diversification of a whole 
economy to industry. The need for transformation implies that, at some point, there needs 
to be a switch in focus from narrower, more technical solutions (such as building higher 
flood defences or providing drought-resistant seeds) to broader institutional approaches 
(such as facilitating migration and a wider range of urban livelihoods). 
The need to think in terms of transformation also applies to low carbon development. A 
central challenge is making the case for radical change – that is, getting political leaders 
interested in the first place.  But new possibilities that come with low carbon 
development can stimulate other kinds of transformation. One example from the Jakarta 
Hub workshop was the potential for the democratisation of energy through low carbon 
decentralised energy technologies, similar to the way that mobile phones transformed 
communication by removing the centralised control of landlines.
Transformation will also require innovation. There is a strong case for increasing support to 
low carbon innovation, especially in technologies of particular use in poor countries and in 
adapting existing technologies to individual country contexts.  Nevertheless, 
transformation can appear risky, and donors and development partners alike are sometimes 
risk-averse, tending to focus on building up resilience and incremental moves towards low 
carbon growth. However, over time, such an approach can become more risky if it invests 
in increasingly vulnerable sectors or areas, or locks people or nations into high carbon 
development pathways. The view in the Learning Hub was that the goal should be to keep 
both possibilities in view, and constantly review the situation on the basis of updated 
information.
GOALS 6
Where next?
This e-book shares the 
knowledge and insights from 
two years of shared learning 
between DFID staff,  
IDS and other external 
experts through the Learning 
Hub programme.
CONTEXT 1
One common theme raised in all the Hub events was that understanding 
the institutional and political context is essential for successful planning, 
programming and policy engagement on climate change. The context, 
whether at regional, national or local level, determines the opportunities 
and constraints for delivering on climate change. Understanding context is 
crucial for making realistic and effective decisions. Three key questions to 
ask are:
Who are the key actors on climate finance in my context?
What is the political economy of climate policy and programming in my 
context?
How to do climate programming in a fragile state context?
The institutional context in a country government is particularly important for thinking about 
how to deploy climate finance including UK International Climate Fund (ICF) resources. 
Public finance for adaptation and low carbon development may eventually be deployed 
through the UNFCCC, but currently much of it is still managed by bilateral donors and 
multilaterals.
In theory, climate finance should be deployed according to the principles of the Paris 
Declaration on aid effectiveness, including country ownership, harmonisation and managing 
results for poor people.  However, in practice these principles often remain aspirations 
and there are a number of barriers to achieving them, including lack of government interest, 
vertical ‘siloing’ of issues in sectoral ministries, confusion as to who has responsibility for 
cross-ministerial agendas and a proliferation of external climate funds. Another frequently 
encountered problem was that climate finance has typically been routed via environment 
ministries, which often have limited convening power and influence. 
1. Key elements of an approach to integrating climate change 
CONTEXT: 
What is my delivery context?
CONTEXT - 
Start
CONTEXT 2
It has also proved difficult to achieve harmonisation between donors on climate change 
programming.  One response to this has been the idea of multidonor trust funds 
(MDTFs), of which there is some early experience in Bangladesh.  For bilaterals like 
DFID, such coordination will mean working closely with actors such as the World Bank and 
the regional development banks.
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y3lfNcF5ymU
The Learning Hub discussions identified advantages of working through MDBs, including:
being able to contribute to making big opportunities happen 
having access to specialist expertise, and 
the prospect of more influence and access in countries where DFID is a small donor
But it was also recognised that such funds can also be slow to spend, attribution of impact 
is diluted, and any one bilateral will have less influence over how the money is spent once 
the basic decision is taken. A degree of competition between donors was also seen as 
valuable. 
The Learning Hub did not provide any easy answers to these challenges. Participants 
recognised that the Paris Declaration principles are clearly important for delivering climate 
finance, but also that a simple, mechanical application is unlikely to work. A key dilemma 
for climate programming is how to ensure the principle of results for poor people where 
there is a lack of strong ownership of the agenda.
The Learning Hub discussions also emphasised the importance of a number of different 
kinds of actors beyond the usual national government institutions who are important for 
understanding context and who should be borne in mind when designing programmes:
Local and city government: There is often a lack of good mechanisms linking national 
and sub-national policy levels found in developing countries.  There can thus be 
benefits of working directly with actors like city governments, who may be more likely 
to innovate. 
Non-traditional donors: such as China and India. China is now a major funder of 
infrastructure and construction in low-income countries, including in the low carbon 
energy sector. Such actors use different tools and have a different approach from 
traditional donors. 
CONTEXT 3
Private sector actors: Businesses often have 
key roles in both planning and delivering 
adaptation, but they are especially important 
for low carbon development, as they will in 
practice have to deliver low carbon 
technologies and investment in many cases. 
This applies not only in the energy sector, but 
also in providing finance for forestry and low 
carbon land management projects.  It 
is important to recognise that the private 
sector is not homogeneous. The small 
companies and social enterprises typically 
involved in delivering small-scale low carbon 
energy to rural poor households are very 
different from the technology firms and 
investors involved in large-scale infrastructure. 
These different actors have different concerns about policy.  Small companies 
often need help with business models and access to finance for scaling up, whereas 
investors are principally concerned about different kinds of risk, implying a range of 
possible measures to reduce that risk (see table: Matching type of leveraging tool).
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NtNKXZhwgtU
  Political economy lay at the heart of most of the issues covered in the Learning 
Hub. There was a strong consensus that for effective climate programming and policy 
engagement, DFID needs to understand:
the interests and incentives of powerful actors in politics, government and the private 
sector
how formal and informal institutions work
what the dominant policy and political narratives are; and 
what kinds of coalitions for change might be possible
Different kinds of political economy analysis are possible, including macro, sectoral and 
problem-driven. Within DIFD a key message was the importance of engaging governance 
advisers with climate issues, and the use of existing resources such as the DFID Political 
Economy ‘How to’ Note (DFID, 2009).
2. Spend some time understanding the political economy of climate change 
and climate policy
Matching type of leveraging tool to 
type of risk and context 
Source: Adapted from Brown, J. and 
Jacobs, M. (2011) Leveraging Private 
Investment: The Role of Public Sector 
Climate Finance, ODI Background Paper, 
London: Overseas Development Institute
CONTEXT 4
Learning Hub discussions pointed to opportunities for DFID to engage with the political 
economy of climate change and development at several levels:
Dialogue with leaders on the visibility of and priority given to climate change issues, 
both adaptation and low carbon development. In many cases, emphasising co-benefits 
or using framings such as ‘jobs and green growth’ instead of low carbon growth, may 
be more effective because they are more aligned to existing interests and narratives. 
This was cited at the Jakarta Hub event as being the case for Vietnam  
Influencing the allocation of climate finance, 
with an understanding of drivers including rent-
seeking, institutional incentives and party political 
considerations. It is important that DFID is aware of 
these dynamics, and seeks to minimise distortions and 
protect the interests of poor people wherever possible
Supporting the reform of particular policies. A good 
example is that of fossil fuel subsidies. These are not 
only a barrier to low carbon development and a major fiscal drain in some countries, 
but also typically poorly targeted. Despite the multiple potential benefits, reforming 
such subsidies is a major political challenge.  However, approaches informed by 
an analysis of the main actors and interests have been more successful, in cases such 
as Ghana 
Managing risks in individual projects, for example political and counterparty risk 
adding to financing costs in low carbon infrastructure projects, or contested land rights 
undermining forest projects 
The Learning Hub also devoted time to a particular focus on fragile states. In such countries, 
where there are failures of the authority and legitimacy of states and public services, the 
constraints arising from the delivery context are most severe.  In fragile states, political 
factors, including rent-seeking, are more extreme than in other low-income countries. 
Levels of trust in government are even lower than elsewhere, capacity to manage information 
about climate stresses is typically very weak and the environment for low carbon investments 
is poor. Such states are less able to handle external shocks, including new shocks arising 
from climate change and from some climate policies; one example raised in the Hub was 
food price spikes arising from failed harvests and biofuel policies. 
The message from the Learning Hub was that, in such contexts, the key immediate goal is 
to build institutions for a stable, peaceful state. As discussed elsewhere, the most important 
elements of adaptive capacity and development of a low carbon development path are 
strong underlying institutions, higher incomes and improvements in wellbeing for poor 
people, including health and education. All of these things require stable peaceful states.
This implies that DFID’s climate programming should engage with the core issues in fragile 
and post-conflict countries to contribute to peace-building and capacity building, whilst 
investing in the adaptive capacity of such institutions. 
3. Fragile states are a particularly difficult context, where building stable 
states is the priority for climate programming
What is rent seeking?
Rent-seeking generally 
implies activities to extract 
value from others without 
making any contribution 
to productivity, often by 
changing the regulatory 
context in their own favour. 
CONTEXT 5
Where next?
Issues highlighted in Hub discussions included: 
the desirability (but also the difficulty) of maintaining stable funding in fragile state 
contexts
the crucial importance of engaging with non-state actors as well as state actors
support to sub-national and regional, transboundary policy processes as well as at the 
national level  
specific projects for climate change in fragile state contexts will need to be sensitive 
to the potential for conflict, for example the possibility that competition for climate 
finance itself may fuel conflict
Learning Hub discussions showed that simply getting climate change on to the agenda in 
fragile states can often be particularly difficult. One potential entry point is the idea of 
climate change as a ‘threat-multiplier’, for example where climate-related pressures on 
natural resources interact with other drivers of insecurity within a political context (the case 
of Sudan was raised in the London Hub event) or lead to erosion of livelihood options, 
migration and vulnerability to trafficking in cities.
Finally, an overarching message on climate programming in fragile states was the importance 
of simplicity: ‘Don’t make it complicated, make it clear, make it deliverable’.
This e-book shares the 
knowledge and insights from 
two years of shared learning 
between DFID staff,  
IDS and other external 
experts through the Learning 
Hub programme.
FOCUS 1
It is essential that those involved in climate change programmes know where 
to look for change, rather than trying to define what the change should be. This 
involves learning about the processes, institutions, relationships and systems that 
are capable of managing and responding to change in ways that reduce poverty, 
build resilience and enhance adaptive capacity of citizens and states.
Development practice is critically challenged by climate change because it is both a result 
of the modern development process and a challenge to future development and poverty 
reduction globally. Climate change therefore needs to be considered as part of a broad 
development-based approach which must also:
manage climate impacts through planned adaptation 
prepare communities and institutions to cope with future change through building 
adaptive capacity
reduce the extent of climate change through emissions reduction and mitigation 
better understand the risks and opportunities that climate change presents to 
development 
Popular macro approaches to building resilience to climate change often rely on top-down 
expert technical advice. They tend to take a linear approach to identifying ‘solutions’ and 
have a narrow focus on ‘proofing’ centralised programmes in traditional sectors such as 
water, agriculture and health. However, Learning Hub participants concluded that:
neither mainstreaming climate change into existing strategies and sectoral plans nor 
designing standalone adaptation plans will necessarily deliver pro-poor outcomes 
top-down planning usually fails to grasp micro-level vulnerabilities and opportunities 
Looking for a single ‘magic bullet’ misses a broader analysis of the issue
This section of the Learning Hub output focuses on sharing areas where consensus for 
action emerged from the Learning Hub process. It begins to map out the types of contextual 
and political analysis, relationships and interventions that are considered critical for moving 
towards a development agenda that is both low carbon and climate resilient.
1. Understanding the nature of the challenge
FOCUS:
How can my work retain  
focus whilst recognising the  
multidimensional nature of  
climate change?
FOCUS - Start
FOCUS 2
Climate change impacts across sectors and scales, with impacts in one space, time or 
jurisdiction leading to disturbances (either positive or negative) in another, closing some 
development options but potentially opening others.  Action for adaptation and emissions 
reduction at all levels will have consequences for development strategies and pathways 
and vice versa. A greater focus on how different sectors, programmes, policies and 
interventions relate to one another is therefore needed.  
Thinking about the ‘whole system’ can help to:
identify where climate signals are 
strongest and where the critical 
connections are for delivering joined 
up solutions
reduce the potential for unintended 
consequences in other parts of the 
whole, by engaging with potentially 
‘messy solutions’ such as investing in 
work in destination communities for 
migrants seeking better livelihoods 
 
provide the space within which to map 
out and identify the co-benefits (and 
trade-offs) of low carbon, adaptation 
and poverty reduction approaches
consider the longer term issues through mapping out potential links between 
environmental degradation, economic crisis and conflict, amongst others 
A whole systems perspective should not overlook the need for improving understanding of 
the impacts of climate change on particular sub-systems or sectors. For example, detailed 
knowledge on water availability and distribution, agricultural productivity, or disease 
distribution and transmission is essential for building a robust ‘whole system’ understanding.
A whole system perspective means finding 
different ways of working with new 
actors, building alliances between unusual 
partners, and ensuring information and 
knowledge flow across sectoral boundaries. 
The next section points the ways in which 
understanding actors, supporting dialogue, 
facilitating information flows, monitoring 
and reflective learning can help to respond 
to such complexity.
2. Start with a ‘whole’ systems perspective
NOTE: 
DFID’s Strategic Programme Review process 
may provide the ideal opportunity to bring 
together advisers in a country office to begin 
to map out the key actors and the critical 
sector links to begin to build a coherent 
DFID response in-country.
What is a ‘whole’ systems perspective?
There are many types of systems and sub-
systems from ecosystems to energy and water 
systems to human development systems (i.e. 
health, education).  Taking a whole systems 
perspective means seeing the whole system 
as a sum of all these parts and understanding 
how they connect with each other, rather 
than thinking about them in isolation – or 
silos.  Problems are then seen as connected 
to the whole rather than as isolated problems 
confined to a discrete sub-system – this helps 
to identify options or solutions external to 
the sub-system in question.
FOCUS 3
 
Understanding the way that climate change is understood and articulated by politicians, 
governments, organisations and citizens is essential for identifying existing interests and for 
creating the incentives to link with the wider climate change agenda.  It will help to answer 
questions including: 
who is best placed to effect change in my context and how can I reach them? 
what is the most appropriate entry point for making climate change relevant?; and 
what are the potential blockages and opportunities that exist for taking forward a 
climate change agenda?
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SDW6WOEUXTI
A clear message from Hub participants was that it is better to work with the existing 
direction and motives in a country and not to try and confront or redirect these interests. 
 For example, in many countries economic growth will remain a central part of the 
development agenda, so there will be a need for a strong story around the role of growth in 
addressing climate change. This will involve identifying what types of growth can be low 
carbon, contribute to building adaptive capacity and support jobs, employment and wealth 
generation. 
Examples highlighted by Hub research into LCD include: 
In Ethiopia, the key drivers of low carbon 
development are poverty reduction and 
economic growth, while energy security is 
less of an issue and climate change mitigation 
even less 
In China, however, energy security was 
marginally more important than economic 
growth, followed closely by mitigation of 
climate change; however, poverty reduction 
motives were negligible
Understanding the entry points and stories relevant to your context may mean that a country 
office may need to invest in improving cross-disciplinary work. 
3. Undertake political economy analysis and stakeholder mapping
Average scores for motives for low 
carbon development in Ethiopia
FOCUS 4
For example, if drought is a common ‘problem framing’ for climate change then an agriculture 
or livelihood adviser may become a key ally, alongside nutrition or Water Sanitation and 
Hygiene (WaSH) advisers. This understanding may also require establishing new sets of 
relationships with sympathetic external actors who have established connections to actors 
and institutions with the capacity to mobilise action.
 Building a systematic understanding of climate impacts needs coordination and 
dialogue between sector experts at all scales, between decision-makers from international 
to local levels and between states.  
Enabling dialogue across sector boundaries can:
generate a diversity of voices and insights to inform climate change responses 
increase the flow of knowledge and information between sectors
identify common entry points and generate political will for climate action in disparate 
departments and institutions
identify both co-benefits and trade-offs between short and long term climate change 
and development interventions
Addressing the issue of scale may be more challenging. There is frequently a gap in effective 
mechanisms that link the national, the sub-national and local levels.  Hub participants were 
in strong agreement that whilst Low Carbon Climate Resilient Development (LCCRD) should 
be locally informed through bottom-up processes, top-down leadership is also required to 
mobilise actors, institutions and resources. There remains a need to address the middle 
ground to ensure synergies and knowledge exchange between the two.  The diagram depicts 
the central point where top-down and bottom-up processes intersect for adaptation.  
Focussing on supporting a sub-national or ‘mezzo’ 
level set of institutions can:
improve knowledge and information flows to 
the local level, which can support 
communities to adapt and plan for uncertainty 
create synergies between autonomous 
adaptation occurring in households, 
communities and the informal economy 
and planned – or top-down – adaptation to 
expand the adaptation options for citizens
broaden understanding of the role of the informal economy 
enable local voices to influence national policy through channelling stories and 
evidence from the ground of grassroots needs and agency
channel finance to low carbon business entrepreneurs operating at the local level
4. Improve the coordination of activities both horizontally (between 
sectors) and vertically (between scales of governance)
Identifying the space for effective 
adaptation
FOCUS 5
Throughout the Learning Hub process participants reflected on DFID’s priority − ‘to eliminate 
poverty’ − seeking to identify how a poverty focus could and should be at the heart of low 
carbon climate resilient development programming. Although both institutions and citizens 
need to be capable of responding rapidly to change when it happens, scientific uncertainty 
around the direction, intensity and timing of change means that planning for adaptation and 
mitigation interventions requires two key approaches:
reduce existing vulnerabilities, build resilience and adaptive capacity in the here and 
now, 
mobilise for the future by:
a.  using climate foresight or scenario planning to identify a range of responses and 
solutions to a range of possible futures
b. triggering broader shifts in thinking, programming and policy that can help to 
embed flexibility, learning and connectivity in systems and plans
The first approach recognises that in the short to medium term climate change responses 
must address underlying causes of vulnerability and exposure to poverty.    
Taking a co-benefits approach suggests that the focus should be on:
investing in ‘gateway’ or underlying systems such as water, transport, energy, health 
and education and in social policy that supports access to such systems 
joining up climate change work with social development and vulnerability work to 
increase the resilience of households and communities
investing in governance work 
The second approach requires you to plan and build for a different future. It recognises that 
the way in which climate change programmes are linked with social development, 
governance and underlying systems requires more than business-as-usual development. 
 For example, work on access to water resources must take into account the changing 
patterns of rainfall in terms of timing and location, that work on access to energy and 
transport needs to be low carbon  and that work on cash transfers  and food for 
work can both tackle chronic poverty and seek to build collective adaptive capacity.
5. Keep the focus on the poor at the centre of the climate change response
FOCUS 6
But low carbon climate resilient development must also take a longer-term view and invest 
in action now that will deliver bigger benefits in the future. For example, some of the big 
opportunities for low carbon development, such as fossil fuel subsidy reform  involve 
long-term policy engagement that will provide an indirect chain to emissions and poverty 
reduction impacts in the future. Making development low-carbon whilst tackling the 
underlying causes of poverty and the impacts of climate change requires thinking about 
both the immediate challenge and the longer-term changes that are required to shift to a low 
carbon climate resilient development pathway. 
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PL67B-21hqE
Climate change suggests that there will be no ‘steady state’ and therefore no ‘final solution’, 
but a continuous process within which learning, experimentation and adjustment must take 
place. It was widely agreed through the Learning Hub process that organisations need to 
invest in systematic learning processes to help prepare them to respond to change, both in 
their internal operations and external relationships.  
Two approaches that should be applied to support learning are:
innovative and experimental programmes 
monitoring and evaluation of change processes and outcomes
Supporting innovation and experimentation demands a positive organisational approach to 
risk − investing where the potential returns on a positive outcome are high.   It 
is essential that such programmes identify points to take stock and reflect on what has been 
learnt, to accommodate new knowledge and then to review and revise both goals and 
possibilities − referred to in the Hub as an ‘act, learn, reflect, adjust and act again’ approach. 
This kind of learning needs to be systematically embedded within all programmes, and 
regular monitoring helps to support this.
6. Embed a culture of learning into organisational behaviour, policy 
and programmes
FOCUS 7
Where next?
Monitoring can increase the opportunities for identifying potential trade-offs between 
sectors and goals, for bringing new knowledge into programme planning, for adjusting 
activities and outcomes and for sharing learning with others. However, monitoring and 
evaluation needs to look not just at what is changing, but to try and understand why change 
is happening, where it is happening and what processes or structures facilitate such change.
And finally, learning – as embodied in this Learning Hub output − should be viewed as 
part of a broader knowledge management and exchange process; supporting peer learning 
within and between donors and international development agencies, and supporting South-
South learning networks.
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